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ABSTRACT 
 
This study aims to verify the usefulness of the tax avoidance proxy developed by Desai and Dharmapala (2006) in 
the setting where accounting-tax alignment is relatively high and aggressive tax planning is restricted. By using a 
large set of firms in Korea, I empirically test whether the tax avoidance proxy detects the management of book-tax 
and book-only accruals. My findings show that downward management of book-tax accruals for tax reporting 
purposes is not detected by the tax avoidance proxy. However, upward management of book-only accruals for 
financial reporting purposes is captured by the tax avoidance proxy. In addition, the tax avoidance proxy better 
detects simultaneous management of two accrual components than management of book-tax accruals alone. Lastly, 
the tax avoidance proxy is more powerful in detecting tax avoidance activities in a sample of firms with high tax and 
financial reporting costs than in firms that carry high tax costs but low financial reporting costs. The results of this 
study imply that the tax avoidance proxy can be a good indicator only when used for firms that are conscious of 
their financial reporting costs and have incentive to manage both taxable and book income at the same time under 
the setting where book-tax conformity is high and aggressive tax shelters are restricted. This study sheds light on the 
usefulness of the tax avoidance proxy which has been widely used in the accounting studies and provides a caveat to 
researchers that the proxy should be employed with caution and in appropriate setting.  
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1.   INTRODUCTION 
 
ook income based on accounting standards is the most widely used summary measure of a firm’s 
financial performance by market participants in debt covenants, compensation contracts, and stock 
market pricing. Taxable income, as determined by tax rules, is used to calculate the amount of taxes 
to be paid to the tax authorities. Therefore, firms have two incentives: to report higher book income for financial 
reporting purposes and to report lower taxable income for tax reporting purposes. When firms report increased book 
income and/or decreased taxable income, the difference between them becomes evident. A large body of literature 
from the U.S. has provided evidence that the book–tax difference reflects earnings management and/or tax 
avoidance (Lev and Nissim 2004; Phillips et al. 2003; Hanlon 2005; Mills 1998; Manzon and Plesko 2002; Desai 
2003). Based on the results of these studies, Desai and Dharmapala (2006) develop a proxy of tax avoidance 
measured by the residual of the book–tax difference that cannot be explained by earnings management. 
 
The proxy developed by Desai and Dharmapala (2006) is widely used in the literature on tax avoidance in the other 
countries as well as in the U.S. However, the tax avoidance proxy should be employed with caution and in the 
appropriate setting because the results of studies that investigate the association between the book–tax difference 
and tax avoidance are not consistent in countries outside of the U.S. For example, in Korea, Shim et al. (2006) find 
no evidence that a higher book-tax difference increases the probability of tax audit and higher penalty taxes, while 
Choi (2012) finds a positive relationship between the book–tax difference and penalty taxes as a result of tax 
investigation. These inconsistent results may be caused by the unique accounting and tax environment in Korea, 
where accounting–tax alignment is relatively high and aggressive tax planning is restricted. Relatively high 
accounting–tax alignment results from differences in treatment of allowances and the depreciation in accounting 
standards and tax laws. In Korea, allowances for uncollectible accounts or pensions are tax deductible as long as 
they are within the limit specified by the tax rules; conversely, they are not tax deductible in the U.S. Many U.S. 
firms use straight line depreciation for book purposes and accelerated depreciation for tax purposes, but Korean 
firms usually use the same depreciation methods and useful life measures for both book and tax purposes (Choi et al. 
B 
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2009). In addition, aggressive tax planning by multinational firms through tax havens or transfer pricing is less 
common in Korea than in the U.S. (Choi and Lee 2013).  
 
In this environment, items with high book-tax conformity are the only opportunistic and primary tools for firms to 
avoid paying taxes. For example, firms may manage the accruals with high book–tax conformity (“book–tax 
accruals”, hereafter) downward in an attempt to reduce taxable income.1 However, downward management of book–
tax accruals affects both book income and taxable income negatively. Thus, firms may adjust accruals with low 
book–tax conformity (“book–only accruals”, hereafter) upward to compensate for the increased financial reporting 
costs without affecting taxable income (Calegari 2000).2 
 
In cases where book–tax accruals are primarily used for tax reporting purposes, the proxy developed by Desai and 
Dharmapala (2006) (“tax avoidance proxy”, hereafter) may not be a good indicator of tax avoidance because it is not 
expected to detect tax avoidance activities that do not affect the gap between book and taxable income. On the other 
hand, if firms use book–only accruals to compensate for the reduction in book income due to management of book–
tax accruals, the tax avoidance proxy may detect upward management of book-only accruals, which generates a 
book–tax difference. However, management of book-only accruals may not be captured by the tax avoidance proxy 
because book–only accruals is a component of total accruals, and total accruals is excluded from the book–tax 
difference in computation of the tax avoidance proxy. This empirical question as to whether the tax avoidance proxy 
captures accruals management requires investigation. Therefore, I test the ability of the proxy to detect management 
of book–tax and book–only accruals. I also test whether the tax avoidance proxy better detects the simultaneous 
management of the two accrual components (downward management of book–tax accruals and upward management 
of book–only accruals) than management of book–tax accruals alone. In addition, firms have incentives to manage 
both accrual components at the same time when both financial reporting costs and tax costs are high. Thus, I 
examine whether the proxy is more powerful in detecting tax avoidance activities in a sample of firms with high tax 
and financial reporting costs than in firms that carry high tax costs, but low financial reporting costs. 
 
To test my hypotheses, I investigate a large set of firms listed on the Korea Stock Exchange during the period 
between 2000 and 2013. My findings show that the tax avoidance proxy does not capture downward management of 
book–tax accruals; however, it is positively associated with upward management of book-only accruals. This 
implies that the tax avoidance proxy is not suitable for firms that cannot opportunistically use tax planning resulting 
in a book–tax difference. In addition, they provide the evidence that the tax avoidance proxy cannot exclude the 
effect of earnings management via book-only accruals. 
 
I also find that the tax avoidance proxy better detects simultaneous management of the two accrual components than 
management of book–tax accruals alone. In addition, by assessing the firm’s tax and financial reporting costs using 
the previous year’s taxable income and debt ratio, respectively, I find that firms with high tax and financial reporting 
costs show higher levels of tax avoidance than firms with high tax costs and low financial reporting costs. These 
results imply that the proxy can still be effective in measuring tax avoidance in firms that have concerns about 
increased financial reporting costs due to tax avoidance activities.  
 
The results of this study provide additional insight into previous findings in tax avoidance and earnings management 
research. First, this study sheds light on the usefulness of the tax avoidance proxy developed by Desai and 
Dharmapala (2006) in the distinctive setting where book–tax conformity is high and aggressive tax planning is 
restricted. The findings provide a caveat to researchers that the level of tax avoidance can be erroneously measured 
by the employment of the proxy without considering the distinctive characteristics of the accounting and tax 
environment. Second, the management of book-only accruals, which can be considered as earnings management, 
should not be overlooked when investigating tax avoidance activities. Lastly, more attention should be paid to tax 
avoidance activities that do not result in a book–tax difference when analyzing firms with high book–tax conformity. 
                                                
1 For example, in many cases, as tax provisions for revenue and expense recognition are similar to those for financial reporting, revenue and 
expenses are recognized in the same period for both tax and financial reporting purposes. These similarities allow managers to reduce taxable 
income by either reducing revenue accruals or increasing expense accruals.  
2 As tax provisions and financial reporting requirements differ in their treatment of allowance for bad debts and depreciation, managers may 
attempt to increase book income only by reducing the allowance for uncollectible accounts or depreciation, leaving taxable income unchanged.  
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I believe that the results of this study are meaningful not only for researchers, but also for users of financial 
information, auditors, and regulators who are interested in tax avoidance activity.  
 
The rest of the paper proceeds as follows. Section 2 describes previous research in this area and lays out the 
hypotheses. Section 3 outlines the research method and the model used to prove the hypotheses. Empirical evidence 
is provided in Section 4. In section 5, I summarize and conclude. 
 
2.   PREVIOUS RESEARCH AND HYPOTHESES DEVELOPMENT 
 
2.1 Previous Research 
 
The book–tax difference has been extensively examined by various researchers. The literature can be classified into 
two categories. Many studies attempt to explain the book–tax difference by focusing on earnings management or 
earnings quality. Other studies attempt to explain the book–tax difference by focusing on tax avoidance. Lev and 
Nissim (2004) investigate the relation between the ratio of taxable to book income and future earnings growth and 
show that a higher book–tax difference is related to lower future earnings growth because the book-tax difference 
reflects earnings management activities that are not persistent. Hanlon (2005) also finds that firms with large 
positive book–tax differences have lower earnings persistence than firms with small book–tax differences. He also 
finds that investors interpret large book–tax differences as a bad sign (referred to as a “red flag” in his study), 
reducing their expectations of future earnings persistence accordingly. 
 
On the other hand, Mills (1998) shows that a large book–tax difference increases the likelihood of IRS audit and 
adjustment. He finds a correlation between the book–tax difference and tax avoidance. Manzon and Plesko (2002) 
also report that a few measures approximating the demand for tax shelters help explain the book–tax difference. 
Desai (2003) also provides evidence that the book–tax difference is related to tax avoidance. He traces the growing 
the book–tax difference associated with differential treatments of depreciation and other factors. He finds that more 
than half of book–tax difference cannot be accounted for by those factors. 
 
Based on the results of the above studies, Desai and Dharmapala (2006) develop a measure of tax avoidance by 
controlling for the component attributable to earnings management activity. They regress the book–tax difference on 
total accruals by assuming that any difference not explained by earnings management can be interpreted as a 
measure of tax avoidance. They interpret the residual book–tax difference as a more precise measure of tax 
sheltering activity; this method has been widely used in studies of tax avoidance. 
 
On the other hand, some studies investigate tax avoidance by focusing on accounting choices that do not lead to a 
book–tax difference. Jenkins and Pincus (1998) find that firms adopt a LIFO strategy in inventory accounting in 
order to save on taxes. Scholes and Wolfson (1992) investigate whether firms shift income across time periods in 
response to the United States Tax Reform Act of 1986 (“TRA 86”, hereafter), which reduced the corporate tax rate 
from a maximum of 46% to 34% over a period of two years. They find that firms shift some portion of their gross 
margin from the preceding quarters to quarters of scheduled tax rate reduction to reduce taxes. Guenther (1994) 
focuses on discretionary accruals that are expected to affect taxable income. He finds reduced discretionary accruals 
in the year prior to the passage of TRA 86 in many firms. 
 
Calegari (2000) extends the research of prior studies by dividing accruals into two different types depending on 
whether or not they affect taxable income. He defines accruals with high book–tax conformity as book–tax accruals 
and finds that firms with increased marginal tax rates due to TRA 86 adjust their book–tax accruals downward for 
tax avoidance purposes. In addition, he defines accruals with low book–tax conformity as book-only accruals and 
finds simultaneous adjustment of book-only accruals upward to accomplish financial reporting objectives. In Korea, 
Choi and Lee (2013) also divide accruals into two components, investigating adjustment of these two components in 
response to tax rate reductions. They find that firms manage book–tax accruals in order to shift taxable income and 
manage book-only accruals in order to compensate for the commensurate reduction in book income in response to 
tax rate reductions. 
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In sum, tax avoidance activities can be classified into two types – tax avoidance that causes book–tax differences 
and tax avoidance that does not. Although the proxy of Desai and Dharmapala (2006) was developed to measure the 
former type of tax avoidance activity, it has been widely used without discrimination between these two types. To 
the best of my knowledge, this is the first study to evaluate the usefulness of this tax avoidance proxy in the unique 
setting where firms are likely to avoid taxes without generating book–tax differences. This study aims to identify at 
what point the proxy becomes a more precise measure of tax avoidance. 
 
2.2 Hypotheses Development 
 
Book–tax differences in Korea are relatively lower than that of the U.S. Specifically, the average ratio of book 
income to taxable income in the U.S. is in the range of 1.4–1.7, while in Korea, it is in the range of 0.9–1.1 (Mills 
and Plesko 2003; Choi et al. 2009). The relatively lower book–tax difference in Korea is mostly due to differences in 
the treatment of allowances and the depreciation in accounting standards and tax laws. First, in Korea, allowances 
are tax deductible as long as they are within the limit specified by tax laws; by contrast, they are not tax deductible 
at all in the U.S. Second, many U.S. firms use straight line depreciation for book purposes and accelerated 
depreciation for tax purposes, but Korean firms usually use the same depreciation methods and useful life measures 
for both book and tax purposes. In addition, there are a less number of multinational firms that opportunistically 
utilize the aggressive tax planning through as tax havens or transfer pricing in Korea than in the U.S (Choi and Lee 
2013). 
 
Therefore, Korean firms that attempt to avoid paying taxes do not have many options; thus, they are highly likely to 
manage items with high book–tax conformity. Accruals with high book–tax conformity are the representative and 
primary tools for tax avoidance in Korea. However, managing book–tax accruals decreases book income as well as 
taxable income, not resulting in the gap between book and taxable income. Accordingly, the management of book–
tax accruals for tax planning may not be detected by the proxy developed by Desai and Dharmapala (2006), which 
measures tax sheltering activity by the residual of the book–tax difference that cannot be explained by earnings 
management. 
 
When firms manage taxable income downward through book–tax accruals, they may also utilize book-only accruals 
to increase the book income, which is otherwise decreased along with taxable income. Strictly speaking, 
management of book-only accruals can be considered as earnings management, but it may be detected by tax 
avoidance proxy since it generates book-tax difference and is likely to be accompanied by tax avoidance. On the 
other hand, management of book-only accruals may not be captured by the tax avoidance proxy because the tax 
avoidance proxy is measured by disentangling total accruals from book–tax difference, and total accruals includes 
book-only accruals. Therefore, I am unable to ex ante predict a direction for the association between management of 
book-only accruals and tax avoidance proxy. To assess the usefulness of the tax avoidance proxy in detecting the 
management of these two accrual components empirically, the first hypothesis is therefore formulated as a null 
hypothesis. 
 
Hypothesis 1: Downward management of book–tax accruals and upward management of book-only accruals are not 
detected by the tax avoidance proxy. 
 
This first hypothesis is set to investigate empirically the relationship between the tax avoidance proxy and the 
management of book–tax and book-only accruals. However, the first hypothesis includes the cases where book-only 
accruals are managed solely for financial reporting purposes. Since the focus of this study is on the accrual 
management related to tax avoidance, the second hypothesis analyzes the usefulness of the tax avoidance proxy to 
detect management of book-only accruals simultaneously managed with book–tax accruals.  
 
Cases of tax avoidance can be classified into two types. Firms that belong to the first type simultaneously manage 
book–tax accruals downward and manage book-only accruals upward. Other firms manage book–tax accruals only 
downward because they are unconcerned about reduced book income. In the first case, a book–tax difference is 
generated, while in the second case, it is not. Since the tax avoidance proxy is created by focusing on the book-tax 
difference, it may be more useful for detection of the former type of tax avoidance than the latter type. However, if 
management of book-only accruals is not captured by the tax avoidance proxy, it may not have the ability to 
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distinguish these two types of tax avoidance. Ex ante prediction of the ability of the tax avoidance proxy to 
distinguish these types of tax avoidance is difficult; therefore, the second hypothesis is formulated as a null 
hypothesis as follows. 
 
Hypothesis 2: The tax avoidance proxy does not distinguish between the simultaneous management of book–tax 
and book-only accruals and management of book–tax accruals alone. 
 
The extent of management of book–tax and book-only accruals varies depending on the firm’s tax and financial 
reporting costs. Firms burdened with high costs for both tax and financial reporting have incentive to manage book–
tax accruals downward to decrease tax costs while concurrently managing book-only accruals upward to decrease 
financial reporting costs. On the other hand, firms that have high tax costs but low financial reporting costs have less 
incentive to manage book-only accruals upward while managing book–tax accruals downward. In other words, the 
probability of engaging in simultaneous management of these two accrual components for tax planning purposes is 
higher for firms that belong to the former group than for firms in the other group. If the tax avoidance proxy is 
useful to detect the probability of book-only accruals management according to firms’ financial reporting costs, the 
level of tax avoidance proxy would be higher for the former type of firms than the latter type of firms. However, if 
the tax avoidance proxy is independent from management of book-only accruals, it is likely that the tax avoidance 
proxy is unrelated to the incentive to manage book-only accruals. Therefore, the level of the tax avoidance proxy 
does not differ according to firms’ financial reporting costs when their tax costs are high. Similar to hypotheses 1 
and 2, the third hypothesis is therefore formulated as a null hypothesis as follows. 
 
Hypothesis 3: The level of the tax avoidance proxy does not differ according to firms’ financial reporting costs 
when their tax costs are high. 
 
3.   RESEARCH METHOD AND SAMPLE SELECTION 
 
3.1 Designing the Research Model 
 
3.1.1 Book–Tax Accruals and Book-Only Accruals 
 
This study follows the approach of Calegari (2000) in calculating book–tax and book-only accruals. First, total 
current accruals for firm i in year t is calculated using the following equation. 
 
TCAi,t = (△CAi,t - △CASHi,t) - (△CLi,t - △STDi,t) - DEPi,t 
 
TCAi,t: Total current accruals; 
 
△CAi,t: Changes in current assets; 
 
△CASHi,t: Changes in cash and cash equivalent; 
 
△CLi,t: Changes in current liabilities; 
 
△STDi,t: Changes in long-term current liabilities; and 
 
DEPi,t: Depreciation expenses for tangible and intangible assets. 
 
(All variables above are scaled by total assets at the beginning of the year) 
 
Second, total current accruals (TCA) can be divided into total book–tax accruals and total book-only accruals. 
Specifically, allowance for bad debts, allowance for inventory valuation loss, depreciation, and amortization 
expenses are classified as book-only accruals (BOA) because they are treated differently by tax laws and accounting 
standards in Korea. Deferred tax assets/liability and tax receivable/payable are also classified as book-only accruals 
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(BOA) because they cannot be utilized to manage taxable income. Book–tax accruals (BTA) are estimated by 
subtracting book-only accruals (BOA) from total current accruals, as follows. 
 
BTAi,t = TCAi,t - BOAi,t 
BOAi,t = △DTAi,t - △DTLi,t + △TAXRECi,t - △TAXPAYi,t - △ALLOWi,t - DEPi,t 
 
BTAi,t: Total book–tax accruals; 
 
BOAi,t: Total book-only accruals; 
 
△DTAi,t: Changes in deferred tax assets; 
 
△DTLi,t: Changes in deferred tax liabilities; 
 
△TAXRECi,t: Changes in income tax receivable; 
 
△TAXPAYi,t: Changes in income tax payable; and 
 
△ALLOWi,t: Changes in allowances for bad debts and inventory valuation. 
 
(All variables are scaled by total assets at the beginning of the year) 
 
The third procedure is to distinguish the discretionary portions of book–tax accruals (BTA) and book-only accruals 
(BOA) by subtracting non-discretionary portions from total book–tax accruals and book-only accruals. Discretionary 
book–tax accruals (DBTA) and discretionary book-only accruals (DBOA) are determined as the residuals of the 
following equations, respectively. 
 
DBTAi,t = BTAi,t - [α0 (1/ASSETi,t-1) + α1 (△ADJREVi,t/ASSETi,t-1) + α2 (CFOi,t /ASSETi,t-1)] 
 
DBOAi,t = BOAi,t - [α0 (1/ASSETi,t-1) + α1 (△ADJREVi,t/ASSETi,t-1) + α2 (PPEi,t /ASSETi,t-1) 
+ α3 (CFOi,t /ASSETi,t-1) 
 
DBTAi,t: Discretionary book–tax accruals; 
 
DBOAi,t: Discretionary book-only accruals; 
 
△ADJREVi,t: Changes in revenues minus change in receivables; 
 
PPEi,t: Tangible and intangible assets subject to depreciation; and 
 
ASSET i,t-1: Total assets at the beginning of the year. 
 
Lastly, changes in book–tax accruals (△DBTA) and book-only accruals (△DBOA) for firm i in year t are estimated 
by subtracting the values of year t-1 from the respective values of year t. The greater the adjustment of book–tax 
accruals to lower taxable income, the higher the negative value of △DBTA. On the other hand, △DBOA will have a 
greater positive value commensurate with the adjustment of book-only accruals in order to manage the book income 
upward without affecting taxable income. 
 
△DBTAi,t = DBTAi,t - DBTAi,t-1 
 
△DBOAi,t = DBOAi,t - DBOAi,t-1 
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3.2.2 The Tax Avoidance Proxy 
 
Desai and Dharmapala (2006) develop a tax avoidance measure by regressing the total book–tax difference (BTD) 
on total accruals. As a result, the component of BTD, which cannot be captured by earnings management, is 
interpreted as a tax sheltering activity. The residual of the following equation is used to represent the level of tax 
avoidance in this study. 
 
BTDi,t = TAi,t + εi,t 
 
BTDi,t: Book–tax difference for firm i in year t; and 
 
TAi,t: Total accruals for firm i in year t. 
 
3.2 Model Specifications 
 
I develop regression model (1) to test the relationships between the tax avoidance proxy and downward management 
of book–tax accruals and upward management of book-only accruals. The tax avoidance proxy (TAXAVOID) is a 
dependent variable and △DBTA and △DBOA are independent variables. Along with our variables of interest, we 
also include control variables that can influence a firm’s tax avoidance. These factors include the firm size, leverage, 
profitability, cash flows, growth, and ownership structure. 
 
The coefficient of △DBTA (β1) is expected not to be statistically significant, as downward management of book–tax 
accruals does not affect the book–tax difference. By contrast, the coefficient of △DBOA (β2) may be positive, as 
upward management of book-only accruals accompanies an increase in the book–tax difference. However, since the 
tax avoidance proxy is measured by the residual excluding the total accruals from the book–tax difference, β2 may 
not be statistically significant if the tax avoidance proxy already controls for management of book-only accruals, 
which is a component of total accruals. 
 
TAXAVOIDi,t = β0 + β1△DBTAi,t + β2△DBOAi,t + β3SIZEi,t + β4LEVi,t + β5ROAi,t + β6CFOi,t 
+ β7GROWTHi,t + β8MTBi,t + β9OWNi,t + β10FORi,t +∑YR + ∑IND + ε  (1) 
 
TAXAVOIDi,t: Desai and Dharmapala (2006)’s tax avoidance proxy for firm i in year t; 
 
SIZEi,t: Log of total assets; 
 
LEVi,t: Total liabilities divided by total assets; 
 
ROAi,t: Net income divided by total assets at the beginning of the year; 
 
CFOi,t: Cash flows from operations divided by total assets at the beginning of the year; 
 
GROWTHi,t: Change in sales divided by previous year’s sales; 
 
MTBi,t: Market value divided by equity; 
 
OWNi,t: Proportion of ownership held by the largest shareholder of the firm; 
 
FORi,t: Proportion of ownership held by foreign investors of the firm; 
 
YR: Year indicators; and 
 
IND: Industry indicators. 
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Regression model (2) is estimated to test the second hypothesis. To verify whether the tax avoidance proxy 
distinguishes between the simultaneous management of two accrual components and management of book–tax 
accruals alone, I deploy a dummy variable, COMP_D. The dummy variable is assigned a value of 1 if △DBTA is 
negative, while △DBOA is positive or 0 if both △DBTA and △DBOA show negative values. If the tax avoidance 
proxy better detects simultaneous management of the two accrual components than management of book–tax 
accruals alone, the coefficient of COMP_D (β1) will be positive. However, if the tax avoidance proxy does not 
distinguish between the simultaneous management of the two accrual components and management of book–tax 
accruals alone, the coefficient of COMP_D (β1) will not be statistically significant. 
 
TAXAVOIDi,t = β0 + β1COMP_Di,t + β2SIZEi,t + β3LEVi,t + β4ROAi,t + β5CFOi,t 
+ β6GROWTHi,t + β7MTBi,t + β8OWNi,t + β9FORi,t +∑YR + ∑IND + ε  (2) 
 
COMP_Di,t: Dummy variable that equals 1 if △DBTA is negative and △DBOA is positive, and 0 if 
△DBTA and △DBOA are both negative. 
 
I develop the following regression model (3) to test the third hypothesis. Firms generally manage book–tax accruals 
and book-only accruals concurrently when both tax and financial reporting costs are high. This study measures tax 
and financial reporting costs using taxable income and the debt ratio in the previous year, respectively.3 Since the 
current year’s taxable income and debt ratio are already affected by the managers’ accounting choices for tax 
planning, the values in the previous year are used as ex ante proxies of tax and financial reporting costs. 
 
TAXFIN_D is a dummy variable which equals 1 if both the taxable income and debt ratio of the previous year are 
higher than those of the median, and 0 if they are lower than those of the median.4 Firms with high tax and financial 
reporting costs have more incentives to choose a tax planning strategy that will generate a higher book–tax 
difference than those with high tax costs only. Hence, if the tax avoidance proxy captures the probability of a tax 
planning strategy to increase the book–tax difference, the coefficient of TAXFIN_D (β1) is expected to have a 
positive value. However, the coefficient of TAXFIN_D (β1) may not be statistically significant if the tax avoidance 
proxy is not unrelated to a tax planning strategy that generates a book–tax difference. 
 
TAXAVOIDi,t = β0 + β1TAXFIN_Di,t + β2SIZEi,t + β3LEVi,t + β4ROAi,t + β5CFOi,t 
+ β6GROWTHi,t + β7MTBi,t + β8OWNi,t + β9FORi,t +∑YR + ∑IND + ε  (2) 
 
TAXFIN_Di,t: Dummy variable that equals 1 if scaled taxable income and leverage ratio in year t-1 are both higher 
than the median value, and 0 if scaled taxable income in year t-1 is higher than the median value, but debt ratio in 
year t-1 is lower than the median value. 
 
3.3 Sample Selection 
 
My initial sample consists of firms listed on the Korea Stock Exchange during the period between 2000 and 2013. 
Financial firms are excluded from the sample due to the unique nature of their financial data. Non-December year-
end firms are also eliminated from the sample for homogeneity. Financial information, market value, and ownership 
data are gathered from the TS2000 (http://www.kokoinfo.com) and KIS-VALUE (http://www.kisline.com) 
databases.5 I also eliminate firm-year observations less than 10 by industry and year because more than 10 
observations are necessary to estimate the discretionary portion of book–tax and book-only accruals, using the 
modified Jones model. Next, I delete observations without △DBTA or △DBOA. Lastly, I exclude firm-year 
observations whose market value, largest shareholder’s ownership, or foreign investors’ ownership is not available 
                                                
3 In this study, the financial reporting cost is measured using the debt ratio. The larger a firm’s debt ratio, the more likely the firms’ manager is to 
select income-increasing accounting strategies (Watts and Zimmerman 1986; Sweeney 1994). Firms with a high debt ratio have higher financial 
reporting costs, and thus are more likely to manage book income upward.  
4 The median used in this study is the value adjusted by year and industry.  
5 The TS2000 and KIS-VALUE systems are Korean equivalents of COMPUSTAT or CRSP in the U.S., providing financial and stock price data 
for firms listed on the Korea Stock Exchange (Choi and Lee 2013).  
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in the databases. These procedures resulted in a final sample comprised of 5,894 firm-years. The procedure for the 
sample selection is presented in Table 1. 
 
Table 1. Sample Selection Procedure 
Procedure No. of Firm-Years 
Observations from data in TS2000 and KIS-VALUE databases excluding firms in the 
financial industry in years 2000-2013. 8,136 
Less:  Non-December year-end firms 294 
Firm-year observations less than 10 by industry and year 161 
Observations without △DBTA or △DBOA  629 
Observations whose market value, largest shareholder’s ownership, or foreign 
investors’ ownership is not available 1,158 
Final firm-years sample 5,894 
 
4.  EMPIRICAL RESULTS 
 
4.1   Descriptive Statistics  
 
Table 2 presents the descriptive statistics for the variables used in the tests. To rule out the effects of outliers, I 
winsorize the top and bottom 1% of each continuous variable. The tax avoidance measure (TAXAVOID) developed 
by Desai and Dharmapala (2006) has a mean (median) of 0.013 (0.011), suggesting that firms tend to avoid their 
taxes on average. 
 
The distributions of the values for △DBTA and △DBOA are symmetrical and their mean (median) values are close 
to zero. The range for △DBTA is wider than the range for △DBOA because book-only accruals are limited to 
accounts with low book–tax conformity such as allowances. COMP_D has a mean value of 0.556, indicating that the 
percentage of firms with negative △DBTA and positive △DBOA is about 56% of the sample (n = 2,947). 
TAXFIN_D has a mean value of 0.386, indicating that the percentage of firms with high tax and financial reporting 
costs simultaneously is about 38.6% of the sample (n = 2,875). 
 
For the control variables, the mean (median) values of firm size (SIZE) and return on assets (ROA) are 19.570 
(19.302) and 0.025 (0.034), respectively. The ratio of debt to total assets in the sample firms is approximately 
44.5%. The sample firms’ growth rate (GROWTH) is about 7.4% and the mean (median) market-to-book ratio is 
1.041 (0.731). The proportion of equity held by major shareholders is approximately 42%, and the proportion of 
equity held by foreign investors is about 9.6% on average. 
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Table 2. Descriptive Statistics for Variables 
Variables N Mean Median SD MIN Max 
TAXAVOID 5894 0.013  0.011  0.085  -0.265  0.339  
△DBTA 5894 0.001  0.000  0.161  -0.556  0.534  
△DBOA 5894 0.000  -0.001  0.045  -0.183  0.196  
COMP_D 2947 0.556  1.000  0.497  0.000  1.000  
TAXFIN_D 2875 0.386  0.000  0.487  0.000  1.000  
SIZE 5894 19.570  19.302  1.475  16.851  23.725  
LEV 5894 0.445  0.448  0.200  0.045  0.942  
ROA 5894 0.025  0.034  0.091  -0.447  0.225  
CFO 5894 0.053  0.049  0.088  -0.220  0.325  
GROWTH 5894 0.074  0.049  0.196  -0.448  0.967  
MTB 5894 1.041  0.731  1.004  0.096  6.341  
OWN 5894 0.421  0.422  0.164  0.069  0.819  
FOR 5894 0.096  0.029  0.138  0.000  0.591  
TAXAVOIDi,t: Desai and Dharmapala (2006)’ s tax avoidance for firm i in year t;  
△DBTAi,t: Change in discretionary book-tax accruals;  
△DBOAi,t: Change in discretionary book-only accruals;  
COMP_Di,t: Dummy variable that equals 1 if △DBTA is negative and △DBOA is positive, and 0 if △DBTA and △DBOA are both negative;  
TAXFIN_Di,t: Dummy variable that equals 1 if scaled taxable income and leverage ratio in year t-1 are both higher than median value, and 0 if 
scaled taxable income in year t-1 is higher than the median value but leverage ratio in year t-1 is lower than the median value;  
SIZEi,t: Log of total assets;  
LEVi,t: Total liabilities divided by total assets;  
ROAi,t: Net income divided by total assets at the beginning of the year;  
CFOi,t: Cash flow from operations divided by total assets at the beginning of the year;  
GROWTHi,t: change in sales divided by previous year’s sales;  
MTBi,t: Market value divided by equity;  
OWNi,t: Proportion of ownership held by the largest shareholder of the firms; and  
FORi,t: Proportion of ownership held by foreign investors of the firms.  
 
4.2   Regression Analysis 
 
Table 3. Analysis for tax avoidance measure to detect the management of accrual components 
TAXAVOIDi,t = β0 + β1△DBTAi,t + β2△DBOAi,t + β3SIZEi,t + β4LEVi,t + β5ROAi,t + β6CFOi,t  
+ β7GROWTHi,t + β8MTBi,t + β9OWNi,t + β10FORi,t +∑YR + ∑IND+ ε   (1) 
Variables △DBTA, △DBOA (Change variables) DBTA, DBOA (Level variables) 
Coef. t-stat p-value Coef. t-stat p-value 
Intercept -0.067  -4.49***  <.0001 -0.068  -4.56***  <.0001 
△DBTA 0.007  1.26  0.208      
△DBOA 0.090  4.39***  <.0001     
DBTA     -0.010  0.01  0.270  DBOA     0.179  0.03***  <.0001 SIZE 0.003  3.97***  <.0001 0.003  0.00***  <.0001 
LEV 0.017  3.19***  0.001  0.016  0.01***  0.002  
ROA 0.230  18.35***  <.0001 0.225  0.01***  <.0001 
CFO 0.344  29.08***  <.0001 0.343  0.01***  <.0001 
GROWTH 0.100  20.16***  <.0001 0.100  0.00***  <.0001 
MTB -0.010  -10.25***  <.0001 -0.010  0.00***  <.0001 
OWN -0.007  -1.15  0.250  -0.008  0.01  0.159  
FOR -0.042  -5.14***  <.0001 -0.042  0.01***  <.0001 
YR Included Included 
IND Included Included 
R2-Adj 0.3665 0.3698 
N 5894 5894 
  
Column A of Table 3 presents the results of regression model (1), which tests the association between management 
of the two accrual components and the tax avoidance proxy. The coefficient of △DBTA is positive, but not 
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statistically significant (t-statistic = 1.26, p-value = 0.208), implying that the downward adjustment of book–tax 
accruals for tax reporting purposes is not detected by the tax avoidance proxy. On the other hand, △DBOA is 
positive and statistically significant (t-statistic = 4.39, p-value < .0001), indicating that the upward adjustment of 
book-only accruals for financial reporting purposes is captured by the tax avoidance proxy. These results suggest 
that the proxy cannot completely exclude the possibility of accruals management, and therefore it should be used 
carefully and only after controlling for the adjustment of book-only accruals, which is not associated with corporate 
tax planning. 
 
As a sensitivity test, I run the regression with level variables for book–tax and book-only accruals (DBTA and 
DBOA) instead of change variables (△DBTA and △DBOA). Column B of Table 3 shows that the coefficient of 
DBTA is not statistically significant, but that of DBOA is positively significant, which is consistent with the results 
of the main regression analysis.  
 
1)  *, **, *** indicate significance levels at the 10%, 5%, and 1%, respectively, based on two-tailed tests.  
2)  The variables are defined as in Table 2.   
 
Column A of Table 4 presents the results of regression model (2), which tests hypothesis 2. The coefficient of 
COMP_D is positive and statistically significant (t-statistic = 2.71, p-value = 0.007), implying that tax sheltering 
activity is better captured by the proxy when firms simultaneously manage both accrual components rather than 
when firms manage only book–tax accruals. This test provides evidence that the tax avoidance proxy is more useful 
in settings where firms manage book–only accruals along with book–tax accruals than in settings where firms 
manage only book–tax accruals for tax planning. 
 
As a sensitivity test, I run regression model (2) with COMP_D1, an alternative measure of COMP_D. COMP_D1 is 
a dummy variable that equals 1 if DBTA is lower than its median value and DBOA is higher than its median value, 
and 0 if DBTA and DBOA are both lower than their respective median values. Column B of Table 4 reports that the 
coefficient of COMP_D1 is also positive and statistically significant at p < 0.001, which is consistent with the 
results of the main regression analysis. 
 
Table 4. Analysis for tax avoidance measure to distinguish simultaneous management  
of book-tax and book-only accruals and management of book-tax accruals alone 
TAXAVOIDi,t = β0 + β1COMP_Di,t + β2SIZEi,t + β3LEVi,t + β4ROAi,t + β5CFOi,t  
+ β6GROWTHi,t + β7MTBi,t + β8OWNi,t + β9FORi,t +∑YR + ∑IND+ ε   (2) 
Variables COMP_D COMP_D1 Coef. t-stat p-value Coef. t-stat p-value 
Intercept -0.056  -2.51**  0.012  -0.046  -2.10**  0.036  
COMP_D 0.007  2.71***  0.007      COMP_D1     0.010  3.84***  0.000  SIZE 0.002  2.06**  0.039  0.002  1.77*  0.078  
LEV 0.011  1.44  0.150  0.006  0.78  0.435  
ROA 0.229  12.64***  <.0001 0.236  12.95***  <.0001 
CFO 0.329  18.71*** <.0001 0.326  18.57***  <.0001 
GROWTH 0.103  14.29***  <.0001 0.114  16.03***  <.0001 
MTB -0.010  -7.12***  <.0001 -0.009  -6.37***  <.0001 
OWN -0.007  -0.86  0.392  -0.012  -1.38  0.168  
FOR -0.039  -3.26***  0.001  -0.041  -3.46***  0.001  
YR Comprised Included 
IND Included Included 
R2-Adj 0.3578 0.3828 
N 2947 2884 
1) *, **, *** indicate significance levels at the 10%, 5%, and 1%, respectively, based on two-tailed tests.  
2) COMP_D1i,t: Dummy variable that equals 1 if DBTA is lower than its median value and DBOA is higher than its median value, and 0 if DBTA 
and DBOA both are lower than their respective median values. The other variables are defined as in Table 2.  
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Table 5 presents the results of regression model (3), which tests hypothesis 3. The results show that the coefficient 
of TAXFIN_D is positive and statistically significant (t-statistic = 4.15, p-value < .0001), which implies that the 
value of the tax avoidance proxy is higher for firms with both high tax costs and high financial reporting costs than 
for firms with high tax costs, but low financial reporting costs. This result can be interpreted as follows: the proxy is 
more powerful in detecting tax avoidance activity in a sample of firms with incentives to manage both accrual 
components simultaneously than in firms with incentives to manage only book–tax accruals. 
 
Panel B of Table 5 reveals the results of regression (2) with TAXFIN_D1, an alternative measure of TAXFIN_D. 
TAXFIN_D1 is a dummy variable that equals 1 if the scaled taxable income and debt ratio in the year t-1 are both 
higher than their respective mean values, and 0 if the scaled taxable income in year t-1 is higher, but the debt ratio in 
year t-1 is lower than their respective mean values. The coefficient of TAXFIN_D1 is also positive and statistically 
significant (t-statistic = 3.53, p-value = 0.000), thus supporting hypothesis 3. 
 
Table 5. The level of tax avoidance depending on firms’ financial reporting costs when tax costs is high 
Variables TAXFIN_D TAXFIN_D1 Coef. t-stat p-value Coef. t-stat p-value 
Intercept -0.119  -5.46***  <.0001 -0.104  -4.91***  <.0001 
TAXFIN_D 0.016  4.15***  <.0001     TAXFIN_D1     0.013  3.53***  0.000  SIZE 0.007  6.01***  <.0001 0.006  5.35***  <.0001 
LEV -0.055  -4.62***  <.0001 -0.048  -4.16***  <.0001 
ROA 0.069  2.85***  0.005  0.083  3.42***  0.001  
CFO 0.322  18.94***  <.0001 0.302  18.40***  <.0001 
GROWTH 0.114  15.08***  <.0001 0.109  14.82***  <.0001 
MTB -0.012  -8.31***  <.0001 -0.011  -7.53***  <.0001 
OWN -0.009  -1.01  0.313  -0.003  -0.33  0.743  
FOR -0.028  -2.58**  0.010  -0.024  -2.36**  0.018  
YR Included Included 
IND Included Included 
R2-Adj 0.2848 0.3024 
N 2873 2588 
1) *, **, *** indicate significance levels at the 10%, 5%, and 1%, respectively, based on two-tailed tests.  
2) TAXFIN_Di,t: Dummy variable that equals 1 if scaled taxable income and leverage ratio in year t-1 are both higher than mean value, and 0 if 
scaled taxable income in year t-1 is higher than the mean value but leverage ratio in year t-1 is lower than the mean value. The other variables are 
defined as in Table 2.  
 
5.   CONCLUSION 
 
Desai and Dharmapala (2006) propose a tax avoidance proxy estimated by the residual of the book–tax difference 
that is not captured by total accruals based on the assumption that the book–tax difference is attributable to tax 
avoidance and earnings management. However, Korea-based studies present mixed results as to whether the book–
tax difference reflects tax avoidance because in Korea, firms commonly attempt to avoid taxes using accruals with 
high tax conformity. Downward management of book–tax accruals leads to a decrease not only in taxable income, 
but also in book income, which does not result in a book–tax gap. Therefore, it is intuitive that for firms engaging in 
tax avoidance activity, when no book–tax gap is generated, the tax avoidance proxy fails to detect this activity. In 
addition, firms concerned about lower book income due to downward management of book–tax accruals may be 
inclined to compensate for reduced book income by upward managing book-only accruals while maintaining the 
same level of taxable income. It is an empirical question as to whether management of book-only accruals is 
captured by the tax avoidance proxy because it increases the book-tax difference; however, the tax avoidance proxy 
is developed to exclude the effect of earnings management via total accruals. In this empirical study, I verify the 
ability of the proxy developed by Desai and Dharmapala (2006) to detect firms’ management of book–tax and book-
only accruals. I test my hypotheses by analyzing archival data on publicly-listed Korean firms during the period 
from 2000 to 2013. 
 
The results of this study show that the tax avoidance proxy does not detect downward management of book–tax 
accruals, as expected earlier. In addition, the proxy is positively related to upward management of book-only 
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accruals, implying that it cannot exclude the effect of earnings management via book-only accruals. I also find that 
the proxy better detects simultaneous management of both accrual components than management of book–tax 
accruals alone. Further, I find that firms with high tax and financial reporting costs show higher level of tax 
avoidance proxy than firms with high tax costs and low financial reporting costs. These results imply that the proxy 
can still be effective in measuring tax avoidance in firms that have concerns about increased financial reporting costs 
due to tax avoidance in settings where accounting–tax alignment is relatively high and aggressive tax shelters are 
restricted. 
 
This study provides guidance to researchers that the tax avoidance proxy should be employed with caution and in 
the appropriate setting. The proxy is not suitable for evaluation of firms that tend to avoid taxes without generating a 
book–tax gap or for nations where such tax avoidance activities are pervasive. Therefore, the proxy can be a good 
indicator only when used for firms that are conscious of their financial reporting costs and have incentive to manage 
both taxable income and book income at the same time. Moreover, this study suggests that it is advisable to control 
for earnings management through book-only accruals when using the tax avoidance proxy. This paper suggests the 
need to develop a new measure or elaborate on the existing tax avoidance measure so that it embraces management 
of items that do not affect the amount of book–tax difference because many firms worldwide commonly avoid taxes 
in ways unlike U.S. firms, where the tax avoidance proxy is most applicable.  
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